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Abstract 19 
Following an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) in a poultry 20 
house, control measures are put in place to prevent further spread. An essential part of the 21 
control measures based on the European Commission Avian Influenza Directive 22 
2005/94/EC is the cleansing and disinfection (C&D) of infected premises. C&D includes 23 
both preliminary and secondary C&D and the dismantling of complex equipment during 24 
secondary C&D is also required, which is both costly to the owner and also delays the 25 
secondary cleansing process hence increasing the risk for onward spread. In this study a 26 
quantitative risk assessment is presented to assess the risk of re-infection (recrudescence) 27 
occurring in an enriched colony caged layer poultry house on restocking with chickens 28 
after different C&D scenarios. The risk is expressed as the number of restocked poultry 29 
houses expected before recrudescence occurs. Three C&D scenarios were considered 30 
namely (i) preliminary C&D alone, (ii) preliminary C&D plus secondary C&D without 31 
dismantling and (iii) preliminary C&D plus secondary C&D with dismantling. The source-32 
pathway-receptor framework was used to construct the model and parameterisation was 33 
based on the three C&D scenarios. Two key operational variables in the model are (i) the 34 
time between depopulation of infected birds and restocking with new birds (TbDR) 35 
and (ii) the proportion of infected material that by-passes C&D, enabling virus to survive 36 
the process. Probability distributions were used to describe these two parameters for 37 
which there was recognised variability between premises in TbDR or uncertainty due to 38 
lack of information in the fraction of by-pass. The risk assessment estimates that the 39 
median (95% credible intervals) number of repopulated poultry houses before 40 
recrudescence are 1.2 104 (50 to 2.8 106), 1.9 105 (780 to 5.7 107) and 1.1 106 (4.2 103 to 41 
2.9 108) under C&D scenarios (i), (ii) and (iii) respectively. Thus for HPAIV in caged layers 42 
undertaking secondary C&D without dismantling reduces the risk by 16-fold compared to 43 
preliminary C&D alone. Dismantling has an additional, although smaller, impact, reducing 44 
the risk by a further six-fold and thus around 90 fold compared to preliminary C&D alone. 45 
On the basis of the 95% credible intervals, the model demonstrates the importance of 46 
secondary C&D (with or without dismantling) over preliminary C&D alone. However, the 47 
extra protection afforded by dismantling may not be cost beneficial in the context of 48 
reduced risk of onward spread. 49 
Key words: Notifiable avian disease; outbreak; control; policy; poultry house. 50 
Implications 51 
Disease caused by highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) severely impacts on 52 
the profitability of poultry farming. It is important to ensure that levels of residual HPAIV 53 
infectivity in the poultry house are sufficiently reduced to ensure recrudescence does not 54 
occur. The outputs of the work presented here have important benefits through supporting 55 
reductions in both labour costs to the farmer and in the time to complete secondary 56 
cleansing and disinfection by not having to dismantle and rebuild complex equipment. The 57 
results of the risk assessment will help inform policy-makers and industry in their decision-58 
making and the risk assessment model could be applied to other avian pathogens such as 59 
Newcastle disease virus using appropriate data. 60 
  61 
Introduction 62 
Avian influenza is an infectious viral disease in birds, including both domestic poultry and 63 
wild birds. Infections caused by avian influenza viruses in poultry cause two forms of the 64 
disease that are distinguished by their pathogenicity. The low pathogenicity phenotype 65 
generally only causes mild clinical signs, while the highly pathogenic avian influenza 66 
(HPAI) phenotype results in very high mortality rates in most poultry species. Disease 67 
caused by highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) may have a severe impact 68 
on the profitability of poultry farming and infected poultry flocks are typically culled (in 69 
developed countries) with potential contacts to other poultry establishments being traced 70 
so as to contain the spread of disease. Several HPAIV subtypes are currently circulating 71 
and are considered endemic in parts of the world such as south-east Asia. During the 72 
period January 2013 to August 2018 (OIE, 2018), 12 different HPAIV subtypes were 73 
reported worldwide with Europe reporting the highest virus diversity (7 subtypes).  74 
New virus strains with altered transmission and infection properties may emerge through 75 
genetic reassortment and mutation. During the winters of 2016/17 and 2017/18 multiple 76 
incursions of HPAIV into Europe including the United Kingdom (UK) (Hansen et al., 77 
2018) occurred. The outbreak of HPAI H5N8 virus induced disease across Europe in the 78 
winter of 2016/17 was particularly severe affecting both wild birds and poultry and was the 79 
largest ever recorded in Europe in terms of number of poultry outbreaks, geographical 80 
extent and number of dead wild birds (Alarcon et al., 2018). The HPAI H5N6 virus which 81 
emerged in the Netherlands in late 2017 caused many events in wild birds in the UK and 82 
Republic of Ireland in that winter (Roberts et al., 2018) but did not affect poultry in the UK 83 
and resulted in only limited wild bird mortality in continental Europe with very few poultry 84 
outbreaks. HPAI is a notifiable disease internationally and following an outbreak in poultry, 85 
control measures are put in place to prevent further spread. Effective and rapid control of 86 
HPAIV in poultry is important to prevent its spreading from an infected poultry house to 87 
other poultry flocks through infection of wild birds or through fomite transmission. An 88 
essential part of the control measures based on the European Commission Avian 89 
Influenza Directive 2005/94/EC (EU, 2005) is the cleansing and disinfection (C&D) of 90 
infected premises. Cleansing and disinfection includes preliminary and secondary C&D 91 
and the dismantling of complex equipment during secondary C&D is also required. 92 
Preliminary C&D is Government funded and involves spraying all parts of the premises 93 
and any contaminated material remaining with disinfectant to ‘damp down’ any virus in the 94 
environment. Secondary C&D is at the owner’s expense and requires cleansing the 95 
premises, including equipment and installations, to remove organic debris, degreasing and 96 
disinfecting and then repeating the process. 97 
In the absence of epidemiological evidence and data on how effective dismantling is in 98 
preventing further outbreaks of HPAIV in a poultry house after C&D, a quantitative risk 99 
assessment model is developed here to assess the probability that newly introduced 100 
immunologically-naive chickens used to restock a poultry house become infected 101 
(recrudescence) with HPAIV after C&D has taken place. Three C&D scenarios in a caged 102 
layer house are assessed, namely preliminary alone, preliminary plus secondary without 103 
dismantling and preliminary plus secondary with dismantling with data drawn primarily 104 
from HPAIV H5N1 scenarios.  105 
Materials and methods 106 
Risk analysis and risk assessment 107 
The terms risk analysis and risk assessment have different meanings. Risk analysis is the 108 
complete process for handling a threat. Risk assessment is a defined stage of the risk 109 
analysis process. Thus the risk analysis process is hazard identification followed by the 110 
risk assessment itself and finally risk management with risk communication important for 111 
all three stages (OIE, 2019). The risk assessment estimates the risks associated with the 112 
hazard and may be qualitative or quantitative. It should be noted that hazard and risk are 113 
different. The hazard is the pathogen, HPAIV in this case, while the risk is the probability of 114 
an adverse event from the hazard occurring, namely recrudescence of HPAI in the 115 
restocked poultry. Risk assessment is one of a number of tools to help manage and 116 
prevent poultry diseases like HPAIV through predicting the risks of outbreaks and 117 
assessing by how much various control processes reduce those risks. Other tools include 118 
epidemiological case studies based on previous outbreaks to identify and rank those 119 
factors which contribute to incursion, transmission and spread of such diseases. The 120 
advantage of risk assessment is that it can used to predict the probability of outbreaks 121 
occurring so that preventative actions may be implemented through risk management and 122 
policy (Goddard et al., 2012), hopefully before an outbreak occurs. 123 
The risk assessment here is based on quantifying the amount of infectivity that restocked 124 
poultry (the receptor) are exposed to from infectious HPAIV remaining in the poultry house 125 
(the source) through all the conceivable exposure pathways within the poultry house (the 126 
pathway). Conceptually these risk assessments, known as “source-pathway-receptor” 127 
models, are relatively simple mathematically although the pathways may be complex 128 
depending on the system being studied. The structure of the risk assessment has to be 129 
appropriate for the system and the hazard. Thus the source-pathway-receptor model is 130 
well suited to environmental/process risk assessments involving a series of protective 131 
barriers. Another risk assessment approach is the entry-exposure-consequence 132 
assessment used for import risk assessment for exotic livestock diseases (OIE, 2019) and 133 
is often qualitative as for example for importation of lumpy skin disease virus into the UK 134 
through cattle hides (Gale et al., 2015). Qualitative assessment does not require 135 
mathematical modelling skills to carry out and so is often the type of assessment used for 136 
rapid, reactive, evidence-based decision making (Kelly et al., 2018). 137 
The choice of qualitative or quantitative in risk assessment depends on the nature of the 138 
available data and the complexity of the model and also the scope of the risk question as 139 
set by the risk manager. Qualitative risk assessment can be applied in the absence of 140 
sufficient numerical data but where there is at least some basic knowledge, expert opinion 141 
or other understanding of the magnitude of the risks for each of the risk assessment steps. 142 
The model here allows for by-pass of the C&D process and is too complex for qualitative 143 
risk assessment. Also being a multiple barriers model (i.e. including removal of manure at 144 
the poultry house, destruction of virus by C&D and decay with time) it is not necessarily 145 
suited to combining multiple low qualitative conditional probabilities using a risk matrix 146 
approach (Kelly et al., 2018). Furthermore adding qualitative probabilities from several 147 
parallel streams as required here is not straight forward. The risk assessment approach 148 
here is therefore quantitative and complements a previous qualitative assessment 149 
(Horigan et al., 2019). 150 
Once the basic mathematical model as defined by the equations relating levels of HPAIV 151 
in the poultry house at point of culling to the risk of infection in the restocked poultry have 152 
been set out, there are several different approaches for quantitative risk assessment 153 
including deterministic and probabilistic. The deterministic approach calculates the 154 
arithmetic mean for each step in the source-pathway-receptor model and tends to deal 155 
with uncertainty by using worst case assumptions particularly where data are lacking 156 
(Gale, 2004 and 2005). The probabilistic approach produces a distribution of risks to 157 
accommodate the uncertainty and/or variation and thus naturally provides 95% credible 158 
intervals in addition to the median probability. This is important because it allows the risk 159 
manager to be 97.5% confident that the risk is not higher. 160 
Model overview 161 
The quantitative model is based on observations made during a site visit to a laying house 162 
which housed 129 000 chickens in enriched colony cages. The model is based on three 163 
parts of the feed stream (namely the metal trough, the moving hopper and the moving 164 
chain) and on three parts of the waste stream (namely the manure belt, the cross-165 
conveyor, and the manure air drying equipment). In addition the floor is included. Colony 166 
cages are not specifically considered, but are included as part of the manure belt which 167 
runs directly underneath the cages. Moving parts were included because of their capacity 168 
to generate dusts, although poultry are unlikely to have direct contact with moving chains, 169 
for example. 170 
The approach uses the “source-pathway-receptor” model developed previously for 171 
assessing the infection risks from pathogens through environmental routes involving 172 
treatment processes such as composting and sewage sludge processing followed by 173 
pathogen decay in the environment (Gale, 2004 and 2005). The source term is the amount 174 
of infectivity in the poultry house at the point of culling and removal of the infected birds. 175 
The receptor in this model is the whole chicken flock used for restocking the poultry house 176 
after the given C&D scenario. By assuming that the dose-response is linear such that just 177 
a single HPAI virion is able initiate infection in a poultry host, albeit with low probability, it 178 
does not matter whether one chicken in the restocked flock ingests the whole dose (and all 179 
the other chickens are not exposed) or whether each and every chicken has an equal 180 
portion of the dose. This approach is equivalent to calculating an arithmetic mean 181 
individual bird exposure as has been used previously for environmental source-pathway-182 
receptor risk assessments (Gale, 2004 and 2005) and avoids the need to estimate the 183 
exact dose ingested by each and every one of the individual restocked birds. Furthermore 184 
by assuming that a certain fraction of the residual infectivity is inhaled or ingested by the 185 
incoming flock, the total number of restocked birds is not required in the exposure 186 
calculation.The whole flock exposure is then used to calculate the probability of at least 187 
one chicken becoming infected in the poultry house (poutbreak), since it would only 188 
need one bird to be infected for the entire restocked population to succumb. The 189 
probability poutbreak is thus in effect the probability of recrudescence in that poultry house, 190 
and its inverse represents the average number of similar poultry houses deploying the 191 
C&D scenario before one had a recrudescence. 192 
The source term: Virus loadings in the poultry house 193 
The quantitative model is based on a large layer poultry house with 129 000 chickens 194 
(reflecting a site visit made in December 2016). It is assumed that 50% (i.e. 64 500) of the 195 
birds are infected and shedding HPAIV at the point of culling. The unit of infectivity in the 196 
exposure assessment is the egg infectious dose 50% (EID50) which is the dose required 197 
to infect 50% of inoculated embryonated fowls eggs (when given to each and every egg in 198 
the group) in laboratory assay. The viral titre contributions to the source term expressed as 199 
EID50 units are estimated as described in Supplementary Material S1 for:-  200 
1. The total HPAIV infectivity from the three bird matrices namely feathers, 201 
faeces and oropharyngeal secretions which goes into the “manure” 202 
(EID50_manure) calculated from data in Yamamoto et al. (2008) and Scottish 203 
Government (2016) together with unpublished data from the Animal and Plant 204 
Health Agency (APHA); and 205 
2. The airborne particulate HPAIV infectivity which settles as dust (EID50_airborne) 206 
calculated from data of Spekreijse et al. (2011). 207 
Distribution of mass fractions of infected material to different feed and waste streams. The 208 
source term considers three waste and three feed streams within the poultry house, 209 
together with the floor, as shown in Figure 1 for enriched colony caged layer houses. It is 210 
assumed that 99.9% of the manure produced is removed daily during normal operation of 211 
the poultry house and that this would have been removed in the 24 hours prior to culling. 212 
Therefore 0.1% of the manure is still present in the poultry house after culling and removal 213 
of the infected poultry. It is assumed that all of the airborne fraction settles as dust after 214 
removal of the poultry. The fractions of manure (fstream_manure) and the fractions of 215 
airborne particulate (fstream_airborne) assumed to be entering each of the three feed 216 
streams and the three waste streams, together with the floor are set out in Table 1. These 217 
are estimated on the basis of the site visit. The source term infectivity in a given stream 218 
immediately after depopulation of the infected poultry (EID50_source_stream) is given by:- 219 
Equation 1 𝑬𝑰𝑫𝟓𝟎_𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒆_𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒎 = 𝑬𝑰𝑫𝟓𝟎_𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒓𝒆 × 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟏 × 𝒇𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒎_𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒓𝒆 +220 
𝑬𝑰𝑫𝟓𝟎_𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆 × 𝒇𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒎_𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒏𝒆 221 
The pathway term: Assessing the barriers and total exposures to re-stocked poultry 222 
The pathway from residual infectivity in the poultry house at the point of depopulation of 223 
the infected flocks to the restocking with the new poultry flock is set out in Figure 2. The 224 
pathway is used to calculate the total exposure to the receptor in terms of EID50 units and 225 
sets out the barriers which act to decrease the exposure to the receptor. These include 226 
natural decay in addition to destruction of virus by the C&D process. 227 
Modelling virus decay during the period between depopulation and restocking. Viruses 228 
cannot multiply outside the host and undergo natural decay once outside the host.  229 
The decimal reduction time (Dt) is the time for a 10-fold decrease (i.e. 1 log10) or 90% 230 
decrease in the virus loading. Dt times for HPAIV H7N1 A/ostrich/Italy/984/2000 and H5N1 231 
A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005 in chicken faeces were 3.33 days and 12.05 days at 4°C and 0.83 232 
days and 4.41 days at 20°C, respectively (C. Warren, personal communication). As is well 233 
known from other studies of virus inactivation, decay is more rapid at the higher 234 
temperature of 20°C compared to 4°C. The Dt time used for decay of HPAIV in this risk 235 
assessment is 10 days. Although the Dt for H5N1 at 4°C is >10 days at 12.05 days, the 236 
value of 10 days takes into account that temperatures may exceed 4°C even during the 237 
winter period (particularly in 2016). Furthermore the temperature in the shed with birds 238 
present is higher, although the temperature will fall after depopulation. Using Dt times for 239 
chicken faeces as in the models here is a worst case scenario because the Dt times 240 
measured in poultry litter were much shorter at <5 min and <10 min for H7N1 and H5N1 241 
respectively at both 4°C and 20°C (C. Warren, personal communication). For the purpose 242 
of risk assessment, decay is assumed to occur over the time period between 243 
depopulation of the infected poultry and restocking with the new birds (TbDR). 244 
Minimum and maximum values of 40 and 90 days respectively were used to define a 245 
uniform distribution for TbDR (see Supplementary Material S2). 246 
Modelling virus inactivation by cleansing and disinfection. In this risk assessment, the 247 
overall inactivation of HPAIV by C&D is modelled by summing the titres surviving in two 248 
separate ‘portions’:- 249 
1. The bulk phase, which undergoes efficient cleansing and disinfection; and 250 
2. The by-pass phase, which misses efficient cleansing and disinfection altogether so 251 
that no pathogen inactivation takes place. 252 
This is based on the method developed by Gale (2004) for removal of pathogens by 253 
composting of catering waste and simplifies the risk assessment methodology into 254 
estimating:- 255 
1. The fraction of pathogen surviving in the properly cleansed and disinfectant-256 
treated bulk phase portion (); and 257 
2. The fraction of debris and organic material (and hence associated viruses) in 258 
those parts within each stream where C&D cannot reach and which therefore 259 
by-passes the bulk phase and effective C&D (fbypass). 260 
The overall fraction of input pathogen surviving C&D for each stream (fsurvive_stream) is 261 
thus calculated as:- 262 
Equation 2   𝒇𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒗𝒆_𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒎 = (𝟏 − 𝒇𝒃𝒚𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔) × 𝜸 + 𝒇𝒃𝒚𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔 263 
Values of  are allocated in Table 1 for each of the six streams and the floor on the basis of 264 
the measured decrease in total aerobic bacteria counts in the most closely related 265 
equipment during C&D of an operational poultry house as reported by Lucyckx et al. 266 
(2015). This is described in Supplementary Material S2. Minimum and maximum values of 267 
fbypass to represent the proportions of organic material (and hence associated viruses) 268 
which by-pass C&D within each stream for preliminary and secondary C&D with and 269 
without dismantling are set out in Table 2. These were used to define a uniform distribution 270 
for fbypass and were based on what is thought to be operationally achievable as set out in 271 
Supplementary Material S2. 272 
Calculation of exposures to restocked poultry through inhalation of dust and ingestion. The 273 
fractions inhaled (finhale) of the remaining infective material (after conversion to dust 274 
through moving parts in the equipment or other disturbance in the restocked poultry 275 
house) by the restocked poultry are set out in Table 1 for each of the streams together with 276 
the fractions ingested (fingest) through feeding and pecking. In the absence of data, these 277 
are based on expert opinion and assumptions as set out in Supplementary Material S2. 278 
Exposures (in EID50 units) to the restocked poultry through ingestion and inhalation were 279 
calculated for each of the seven streams from EID50_source_stream (Equation 1) allowing for 280 
decay of HPAIV according to Dt over the TbDR period in the fraction, fsurvive_stream, (from 281 
Equation 2) of HPAIV surviving C&D in each stream. The equations are set out in 282 
Supplementary Material S2. The total poultry exposure (Exposure_EID50) was 283 
calculated as the sums of the exposures through the ingestion and inhalation routes for 284 
each of the seven streams using equations set out in Supplementary Material S2. This 285 
represents the total exposure to the poultry in a given poultry house. The units are “EID50 286 
in total poultry population per poultry house”. Because the model assumes that a fixed 287 
proportion of the remaining infectivity is ingested or inhaled (according to fingest and finhale in 288 
Table 1) by the poultry flock as a whole, the risk assessment is not dependent on the 289 
number of restocked poultry. This is realistic for poultry houses with large numbers of birds 290 
where a steady state is likely to be reached over a few days, but would be less appropriate 291 
for houses with only a few birds. This avoids a more complex calculation involving the 292 
estimation of how much debris each of 129 000 chickens ingests each day and the 293 
number of days over which this could occur. 294 
Receptor term: Calculating the risk of infection of the poultry house 295 
The number of chicken ID50s ingested by the chicken flock as a whole within the 296 
poultry shed (NChicken_ID50) is calculated from the total poultry exposure (Exposure_EID50) 297 
using the poultry infectivity data for HPAIV H5N1 of Aldous et al. (2010) as described in 298 
Supplementary Material S2. The probability of at least one infected chicken in the poultry 299 
house, and hence the probability of an outbreak in the poultry house, poutbreak, is then given 300 
by:- 301 
Equation 3   𝒑𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒃𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒌 = 𝟏 − (𝟏 − 𝒑𝟓𝟎)
𝑵𝑪𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒏_𝑰𝑫𝟓𝟎 302 
where p50 is the risk of infection from a single chicken ID50 when given to a chicken (i.e. 303 
0.5). The inverse of poutbreak, is the number of infected poultry houses cleansed according 304 
to the given C&D procedure before recrudescence in the restocked poultry is expected to 305 
occur in one. The number of infected chickens in the poultry house could be calculated 306 
from NChicken_ID50 as done for livestock grazing on land to which composted catering waste 307 
had been applied (Gale, 2004) and would be greater than one for high values of 308 
NChicken_ID50. However, the number of infected chickens in the poultry house is of little 309 
interest here as we are not modelling severity of consequence or the probability of 310 
detection of the infected flock (which would increase with higher numbers of infected 311 
birds). If a chicken ingests more than one ID50 (due to spatial heterogeneity) it is 312 
preventing other chickens in that house from being infected. With high values of 313 
NChicken_ID50, then poutbreak (i.e. the probability of one or more infected chickens) in Equation 314 
3 tends to 1 and with just one chicken infected, recrudescence has occurred. 315 
Running the model 316 
The model was run in R Studio with 1 000 iterations using the equations and parameters 317 
as set out in this paper and in the Supplementary Material S1 and S2. This number of 318 
iterations gave convergence of the probability distributions and outputs. The R code is set 319 
out in Supplementary Material S3. For each of the 1 000 iterations a single value is used 320 
for each of the input parameters in the equations of the model giving a single estimate of 321 
the output, poutbreak. Values for most of the parameters in the model are constant and are 322 
the same for each iteration, for example Dt is always 10 days. However, for each iteration, 323 
the programme draws a random value for fbypass for each of the feed and waste streams 324 
and for the floor and also draws a random value for TbDR from their respective uniform 325 
distributions with minimum and maximum values specified in Table 2 for fbypass and 326 
between 40 and 90 days for TbDR. Thus the model output, poutbreak, is different for each 327 
iteration giving 1 000 different versions of poutbreak which are represented by the frequency 328 
distribution in Figure 3.  329 
Validation of the model 330 
Sargent (2011) discussed validation techniques for simulation models. Event validity 331 
where the output of the model is compared with epidemiological data is difficult due to the 332 
lack of case-control studies on recrudescence of HPAI after C&D. Extreme condition tests 333 
and sensitivity analyses where parameter values are altered gave expected outputs. For 334 
example setting fbypass to 0 or 1 in Equation 2 gives fsurvive_stream equal to  and 1.0 335 
respectively as expected and reducing the percentage of infected birds in the source term 336 
from 50% to 5% increased the predicted average number of houses before a 337 
recrudescence by 10-fold as expected. As part of face validity (Sargent, 2011), 338 
representatives of poultry industry agreed the conceptual model represented in Figure 1 339 
and Figure 2 was correct and that the model’s input-output relationships are reasonable 340 
(Gale et al., 2018). 341 
Results 342 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus loadings in a poultry house at point of culling and 343 
removal (depopulation) of infected poultry 344 
The total HPAIV infectivity in the poultry house at the end of depopulation and after 345 
removal of 99.9% of the manure is 3.89 107 EID50s (Supplementary Table S1). This is 346 
mainly from cloacal/oropharyngeal secretions and feathers in the remaining manure, with 347 
settling of airborne particulate making only a small contribution. By apportioning the 348 
infectivity according to the fractions, fstream_manure and fstream_airborne from Table 1 in Equation 349 
1, the amounts of infectivity in each of the feed and waste streams and on the floor at the 350 
point of depopulation are calculated (Table 3). 351 
Predicted exposures and risks of recrudescence to restocked poultry 352 
The estimated median HPAIV exposures to the restocked poultry in terms of EID50s per 353 
poultry house are presented in Table 4. Secondary C&D (without dismantling) decreases 354 
the median exposure by 15-fold compared to just preliminary C&D alone. When 355 
dismantling is applied, the median exposures are decreased by a further 6-fold, and the 356 
overall decrease in exposure compared to preliminary C&D alone is over 88-fold. These 357 
decreases in exposure directly reduce the risks of recrudescence reflecting the linear 358 
nature of Equation 3 at low doses as shown in Table 4 by the number of poultry houses 359 
treated by a given C&D scenario before recrudescence occurs in one. Thus applying 360 
secondary C&D without dismantling decreases the median number of poultry houses 361 
which can be restocked by 16-fold compared to preliminary C&D alone, and dismantling 362 
during secondary C&D has an additional 6-fold preventative effect. 363 
The uncertainty in C&D efficacy is assessed by putting in lower and upper limits for the 364 
degree of by-pass (Table 2). The frequency distributions for the values of poutbreak predicted 365 
by the model are presented in Figure 3. There is considerable uncertainty/variation in the 366 
predicted risks  with estimates of the number of poultry houses treated with secondary 367 
C&D without dismantling ranging between 781 and 5.6 107 before a recrudescence 368 
occurs, i.e. almost five orders of magnitude (Table 4).  369 
Discussion 370 
This study provides a risk-based approach for the control of HPAIV following an outbreak 371 
in an enriched colony caged poultry house with specific reference to cleansing and 372 
disinfection (C&D). It can be used as an evidence base for proportionate but effective 373 
approaches to the application of C&D after an outbreak. It will inform policy-makers and 374 
industry in their decision-making and could be applied to other avian pathogens such as 375 
Newcastle disease virus using appropriate data. It could also be applied to other poultry 376 
production systems. A source-pathway-receptor framework model is developed with data 377 
for HPAIV H5N1 and the output is the expected number of infected poultry houses treated 378 
with the particular C&D scenario before recrudescence occurs when restocked with 379 
susceptible birds. Uncertainty and variation in the degree of by-pass and variation in the 380 
total time (days) between depopulation and restocking (TbDR) are modelled using Monte 381 
Carlo simulations based on uniform distributions such that each value has an equal 382 
probability of being drawn. 383 
Central to the model is the estimation of the overall inactivation of virus by C&D using 384 
Equation 2 and the degree of by-pass, i.e. the proportion of the residual infective material 385 
that does not come into contact with disinfectant during the C&D process. Although there 386 
are no data on the degree of by-pass during C&D with and without dismantling, the level of 387 
by-pass is chosen to reflect what is thought to be operationally achievable. Such an 388 
approach has been used previously for composting of catering waste (Gale, 2004) and for 389 
treatment of sewage sludge (Gale, 2005). Obtaining experimental measurements of by-390 
pass data would be logistically difficult in practice during C&D at an operational poultry 391 
house not least from the point of view of experimental design. In particular it would be 392 
difficult to quantify with reliability the infective material present in the poultry house and its 393 
equipment without actually dismantling before commencing preliminary C&D and then 394 
again before secondary C&D and finally after secondary C&D. In effect, dismantling would 395 
be needed before and after both preliminary and secondary C&D to measure the amount 396 
of infected material remaining which would be disturbed in the process.  397 
The TbDR is variable and has a significant effect on the amount of decay and hence the 398 
predicted risk. Thus with a Dt of 10 days as used here, if the TbDR is 40 days, then there 399 
is 4-log10 decay. In the model, the median TbDR is 65 days and the maximum TbDR is 90 400 
days over which 6.5 log10 and 9 log10 decays respectively are predicted according to the 401 
model. However, this is based on the assumption that decay of the virus occurs linearly up 402 
to 9 log10 units over 90 days. Typically experimental data for virus decay demonstrate up 403 
to ~4-log10 decay. Thus there are uncertainties in extrapolation to greater than 4-log10 404 
decay (i.e. over the 40 to 90 day TbDR period) particularly as virus decay is typically non-405 
linear with a long tail perhaps representing a more resistant subpopulation of virus/matrix 406 
complex. However, since Dt values for poultry litter are in the range of <5 to <10 minutes 407 
and may be more appropriate than the Dt value of 10 days used here based on HPAIV 408 
decay in chicken faeces (C. Warren, personal communication), it is not considered that the 409 
risk estimates presented here are over-optimistic. A further source of uncertainty in the Dt 410 
time for HPAIV decay arises from the temperature and humidity conditions. Thus Guan et 411 
al. (2017) show that the absolute humidity is an important parameter in the inactivation of 412 
H9N2 and H6N2 virus on both non-porous and wood surfaces. This is potentially important 413 
for a poultry house being cleansed and disinfected because a lot of water is used, and the 414 
relative humidity could be high due to the dampness. 415 
Other assumptions in the exposure assessment are that disinfection is highly effective at 416 
inactivating the HPAIV H5N1 in the parts of the poultry house that it contacts as reflected 417 
in the small values of  for the “bulk” phase. It should be noted, however, that the actual 418 
values of  (Table 1) are not important in this risk assessment because the values of fbypass 419 
(Table 2) are orders of magnitude higher and therefore dominate in Equation 2. Thus when 420 
fbypass is much greater than , fsurvive_stream tends to fbypass in Equation 2. The model also 421 
makes assumptions for the amounts of infectivity inhaled and ingested by the restocked 422 
poultry. We consider these are worst case scenario estimates. Calculating the total virus 423 
loading (NChicken_ID50) on the restocked poultry population as a whole addresses potential 424 
issues of the spatial and temporal heterogeneity of exposures to individuals amongst the 425 
restocked birds and in effect assumes each and every chicken is exposed to the same 426 
very small sub-fraction (1/129 000th) of NChicken_ID50. Thus whether one bird in the flock 427 
ingests the entire NChicken_ID50 dose, (and all the other 128 999 birds have zero exposure), 428 
or whether all 129 000 birds have an equal 1/129 000th of NChicken_ID50 is not important for 429 
the estimation of risk. As discussed for the model of the risks to livestock from composted 430 
catering waste (Gale 2004), assuming all birds receive the same small sub-fraction as in 431 
the latter scenario would predict higher risks than for the former scenario particularly for 432 
high values of NChicken_ID50. Equation 3 assumes that the dose-response is linear down to 433 
one HPAI virion. Indeed, it is quite acceptable for NChicken_ID50 in Equation 3 to be a fraction 434 
of an ID50 as in the median exposures from Table 4 because the dose-response is linear 435 
and Equation 3 tends to poutbreak = 0.69 x NChicken_ID50 at low values of NChicken_ID50 (Gale, 436 
2004). A recent attempt to develop a mechanistic dose-response model for viruses (Gale, 437 
2018) has indicated a theoretical mechanism for a threshold effect where the virus dose 438 
needs to be sufficiently high to overwhelm the host innate defences (e.g. mucins in 439 
mucus), although this has not be proven experimentally. Clearly allowing for a minimum 440 
infectious dose (MID) greater than one virion in the model would greatly diminish the 441 
risks predicted here to the re-stocked poultry, depending on the magnitude of that MID. 442 
This is because a single virion alone could not cause infection and those individual birds 443 
exposed to doses below the MID would not be infected in reality but according to the 444 
model here are at risk of infection. However, the exposure assessment would have to be 445 
modified to predict the actual exposure to each and every one of the 129 000 chickens 446 
taking into account all sources of variation in the source and pathway terms so as to 447 
predict how many chickens are exposed to doses above the MID. A further consideration 448 
is whether the exposure to individual poultry in the restocked birds is in one single 449 
exposure or repeated over several days or weeks. Thus, exposure to small amounts of 450 
virus distributed over a longer time might influence the virus inactivation by the immune 451 
system resulting in a higher resistance against infection than in case of exposure to the 452 
whole dose at once (Pujol et al., 2009; Marois et al., 2012). The risk assessment here 453 
takes a worst case and ignores this possibility. Indeed, it is likely that the highest 454 
exposures would occur early on for the restocked birds.  455 
The predicted values of poutbreak in Figure 3 vary over some six orders of magnitude mainly 456 
reflecting the large range for TbDR in the uniform distribution and the assumption of log-457 
linear decay of HPAIV over the TbDR. This together with more information on the degree 458 
of by-pass highlights areas of the model for which additional field data would be of use. 459 
Overall, the probability of recrudescence of HPAI disease in caged layers following 460 
depopulation and C&D can be considered very low based on applying secondary C&D and 461 
the TbDR of 40 to 90 days. The results presented here confirm that the dual barriers of 462 
both HPAIV decay over the TbDR and HPAIV inactivation by the preliminary followed by 463 
secondary C&D processes minimise the risks of recrudescence.. With preliminary C&D 464 
alone, there is 97.5% credibility that 50 poultry houses could be restocked before a 465 
recrudescence event. Applying secondary C&D without dismantling at the same level of 466 
confidence this increases on average to 781 poultry houses that could be restocked before 467 
recrudescence occurs. Thus on the basis of these lower 95% credible intervals, the model 468 
clearly demonstrates the importance of secondary C&D without dismantling over 469 
preliminary C&D alone. However, dismantling during secondary C&D only increases this 470 
lower credible interval by a further five-fold to 4 200 poultry houses, and given the 471 
diminishing return, it is concluded that the extra protection to the restocked chickens 472 
afforded by dismantling may not justify the financial expense or the time delay in 473 
completing secondary C&D with respect to minimising the risk of onward spread of HPAIV. 474 
In summary, secondary C&D has substantial benefit over preliminary C&D alone by 475 
decreasing the risks to restocked poultry by ~16-fold while dismantling during secondary 476 
C&D only adds a further six-fold decrease in risk to the restocked poultry. The level of by-477 
pass used for these estimates is a key source of uncertainty requiring investigation with 478 
experimental models.  479 
Conclusions 480 
It is concluded that dismantling complex equipment in a poultry house during secondary 481 
cleansing and disinfection (C&D) may not be cost beneficial to the owner in terms of 482 
protecting against further outbreaks of HPAI. However, taking into account the uncertainty 483 
in the efficiency of C&D together with the variation in the time between depopulating and 484 
restocking, it is concluded that preliminary C&D alone is not sufficient and that secondary 485 
C&D (with or without dismantling) should be performed. 486 
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Table 1. Fractions of infectivity entering, surviving cleansing and disinfection (C&D) and 571 






  finhale  fingest  
Feed streams      
Metal trough 0.001 0.01 3.16 10-4 (Feed 
pan) 
0.0001 0.5 
Moving hopper 0.001 0.01 7.9 10-5 (Feed 
hopper) 
0.1 0.5 
Moving chain 0.001 0.01 7.9 10-5 (Feed 
hopper) 
0.1 0.5 
Waste streams      










0.05 0.05 6.3 10-5 (Air 
outlet) 
0.1 0.1 
Floor 0 0.62 7.9 10-5 (Floor) 0.1 0 
fstream_manure and fstream_airborne, respective fractions of masses of manure and settled particulate 
from airborne material within different streams in the poultry house. 
, fraction of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus surviving C&D of the ‘bulk’ phase based on 
data for total aerobic bacteria counts surviving C&D of an operational poultry house (Lucyckx et 
al., 2015) in the most closely related equipment given in parentheses. 
finhale, fraction converted to dust during operation of poultry house and inhaled by the restocked 
poultry. 
fingest, fraction ingested by the restocked poultry during pecking and feeding. 
 573 
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 576 
Table 2. Minimum and maximum values used to define the uniform distributions for the fraction by-577 
passing the ‘bulk’ phase (fbypass) within the poultry house during cleansing and disinfection.  578 
















0.1 0.01 to 0.1 0.1 - 0.4 
0.01 – 



































  581 
 582 
 583 
Table 3. Source Term: Estimated amounts of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus infectivity 584 
(units of egg infectious dose 50%) in the different streams within poultry house at the point of 585 
depopulation of infected poultry. 586 











Manure 3.88 104 3.88 104 3.88 104 3.48 107 1.94 106 1.94 106 0 
Airborne 








Table 4. Median values and 95% credible intervals (brackets) as predicted by the model for highly 594 
pathogenic avian influenza virus exposures to a restocked chicken flock in a poultry house, and the 595 
risk of infection of the poultry house.  596 
 Total poultry 
exposure 
(Exposure_EID50) as 
egg infectious dose 
50% units per 
poultry house 
Probability (per 
poultry house) of 
infection of poultry 
house (poutbreak) 
Number of poultry 




0.30 (1.3 10-3 to 
71.2) 
8.3 10-5 (3.6 10-7 to 






2.0 10-2 (6.4 10-5 to 
4.7) 
5.1 10-6 (1.7 10-8 to 






3.4 10-3 (1.2 10-5 to 
0.87) 
0.95 10-6 (3.4 10-9 to 
2.4 10-4) 1.1 106 (4.2 103 to 2.9 108) 
C&D: Cleansing and disinfection. 
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List of figure legends 600 
 601 
Figure 1: Source term contributions of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus as 602 
egg infectious dose 50% (EID50) units from infected chickens in manure (EID50_manure) 603 
and as particulate matter in the air which settle as dust (EID50_airborne) at point of 604 
depopulation of poultry house. The fractions of manure (fstream_manure shown as 605 
percentages in normal font) and the fractions of airborne particulate (fstream_airborne 606 
shown as percentages in italic font) entering each stream are from Table 1. 607 
 608 
 609 
Figure 2: Pathway detailing the fate of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus 610 
infectivity as egg infectious dose 50% (EID50) units to calculate total exposure to 611 
restocked chicken poultry flock (Receptor) after cleansing and disinfection (C&D) 612 
and virus decay over the time between depopulation of infected chickens and 613 
restocking with new chickens (TbDR). 614 
 615 
 616 
Figure 3: Frequency distribution for the values of the probability of recrudescence 617 
per chicken poultry house (poutbreak) as predicted by 1 000 iterations of the model for 618 
a) preliminary cleansing and disinfection (C&D) alone; b) preliminary C&D followed 619 
by secondary C&D without dismantling; and c) preliminary C&D followed by 620 
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The source term: Virus loadings in the poultry house 
Loadings from the three bird matrices, namely feathers, faecal (cloacal), and 
oropharyngeal secretions. 
Titres of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) are typically reported as egg 
infectious dose 50% (EID50) units. The total HPAIV infectivity from the three bird 
matrices namely feathers, faeces and oropharyngeal secretions which goes into the 
“manure” (EID50_manure) is calculated from data in Yamamoto et al. (2008) and Scottish 
Government (2016) together with unpublished data from the Animal and Plant Health 
Agency (APHA). There are few published shedding data for HPAIV in chickens and the 
risk assessment therefore draws on published data for other bird species. Yamamoto et al. 
(2008) presented H5N1 viral titres in feathers, oropharyngeal swabs and cloacal swabs 
from three domestic ducks inoculated with H5N1. The titres were not only highest in the 
feathers (3.8 to 6.9 log10 EID50 /ml) but also were detected for longer periods of time (8 
days post infection) compared to in cloacal and oropharyngeal secretions. Although the 
presence of H5N1 virus in bird feathers is an important consideration, feathers are lost 
infrequently compared to oropharyngeal and cloacal secretions which are produced daily, 
and therefore feathers may only make a small contribution to the “manure” in the poultry 
sheds. Viral titres of H5N1 were higher in oropharyngeal secretions than in cloacal 
secretions and the data for oropharyngeal secretions are therefore used in this risk 
assessment. This represents a worst case scenario because much more cloacal secretion 
is produced than oropharyngeal. According to Yamamoto et al. (2008), the highest duck 
oropharyngeal EID50 was at 4 days post infection at 103.7 EID50/ml. It is assumed that 1 ml 
equates to 1 g of manure and therefore the viral loading is 103.7 EID50/g manure produced 
by an infected bird. APHA unpublished data indicate that peak shedding titres for H5N1 
clade 2.2 virus in chickens and turkeys are similar at 103.0 to 104.0 EID50/ml. 
Manure production data for poultry are used to estimate the amount of solid secretion 
produced per bird per day. Caged layers (over 17 weeks in age) have been reported to 
produce 0.84 tonnes of manure per 1 000 birds per week (Scottish Government, 2016). 
This is equivalent to 120 g per bird per day. The total viral infectivity produced in the 
poultry house at point of culling from cloacal, oropharyngeal and feathers is calculated as 
120 g/bird/day x 64 500 infected birds x 103.7 EID50/g = 3.88 1010 EID50/day. This is in the 
form of manure, which is removed from the house at a constant rate by the moving 
manure belt. For example, 129 000 poultry would produce 15.4 tonnes of manure per day, 
and the poultry house would rapidly fill up with manure if it were not removed. It is 
assumed that 99.9% of manure is removed from the poultry house each day and that this 
would have been removed in the 24 hours prior to culling, with 0.1% being left in the 
poultry house after culling and removal of the infected poultry. Thus 15.4 kg of manure are 
left each day, representing 3.88 107 EID50 (EID50_manure) in the poultry house at the point of 
culling and depopulation (Table S1). 
Airborne infectivity which settles as dust. 
The airborne particulate HPAIV infectivity which settles as dust (EID50_airborne) is 
calculated from data of Spekreijse et al. (2011). To estimate HPAIV H5N1 loadings from 
air and dust in the poultry house immediately prior to the point of culling, the number of 
airborne EID50 produced per infected chicken per day is calculated from the air sampling 
data of Spekreijse et al. (2011) who collected 20 air samples over 10 days, i.e., two 
samples per day in each of two rooms with chickens experimentally infected with HPAIV 
H5N1. Each sample was collected over 10 minutes at a rate of 8 m3/minute and thus 
represents 1.33 m3. In one room of volume 22 m3, one air sample contained 101.6 EID50 on 
day 2 and another on day 3 contained 101.3 EID50 (totalling 59.8 EID50 in the two samples 
combined). The other 18 samples from that room collected over days 1 to 10 were 
negative. As a worst case scenario only the data from the two positive shedding days 
(days 2 and 3) are used here. The total volume sampled in that one room over those two 
days (i.e. four samples) was 4 x 1.33 m3 = 5.33 m3 of air. Thus 13 infected birds produced 
59.8 EID50 in 5.33 m3 of air. Assuming this was representative of the 22 m3 volume of the 
whole room, then 13 infected birds produced 246 EID50 in the room as a whole. The 
number of airborne EID50 is thus 18.9 per bird in the first room. In the second identical 
room, however, 56 birds were infected but no airborne infectivity was detected. Combining 
the results from the two rooms gives 59.8 EID50 in 10.67 m3 (8 air samples over two days) 
which is 5.6 EID50 per m3. Over 44 m3 (i.e. the two 22 m3 volume rooms), this is 246 EID50 
in both rooms from a total of 69 infected birds over two days. The airborne output per 
infected bird is therefore 3.57 EID50 per infected bird. Since data from two days are used, 
the estimated airborne infectivity per infected bird per shedding day is 1.78 EID50. For the 
H5N1 HPAIV infected chickens, the mean infectious period (days of shedding) was 1.3 
days (Spekreijse et al., 2011). Assuming 64 500 H5N1-infected birds are present at the 
time of culling and depopulation then the total airborne loading (EID50_airborne) is 64 500 
infected birds x 1.3 days x 1.78 EID50 = 1.5 105 EID50s (Table S1). It is assumed that all of 
this airborne infectivity has settled as dust within the house at the end of depopulation. 
Poultry catching normally involves unrest and wing-flapping, which potentially can 
redistribute the virus load in the poultry house. This together with the generation of 
aerosols during the cull process is assumed to be included in the estimated loading in 
cloacal secretions which are based on oropharyngeal titres. 
  
Table S1. Summary of predicted levels of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus (EID50s) in 
a chicken poultry house at point of depopulation of poultry.  










All settles as dust 1.5 105 
Total Sum of EID50_manure and 
EID50_airborne 
3.89 107 
Assumes 129 000 birds in the poultry house of which 50% are infected at culling. 
EID50: Egg infectious dose 50% 
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The time period between depopulation of the infected poultry and restocking with 
the new birds 
The minimum possible time period between depopulation of the infected poultry and 
restocking with the new birds (TbDR) is 42 days (EU, 2005). There are typically 2 days 
between depopulation and preliminary cleansing and disinfection (C&D), 7 days 
between the first round of cleaning and the second round of cleaning in secondary C&D, 
and 7 days for secondary C&D. In addition, the re-population of commercial poultry 
holdings shall not take place for a period of 21 days following the date of completion of the 
final cleansing and disinfection as provided for in Article 48 the restocking information (EU, 
2005). This does not take into account the extra time for decay gained by the practice of 
dismantling. The expert opinion estimation of TbDR is between 40 and 90 days (P. 
McMullin, personal communication), and these two values were used to define a uniform 
distribution. 
Estimating the fraction of pathogen surviving in the properly cleansed and 
disinfectant-treated bulk phase portion 
Virkon S is a disinfectant officially authorised for C&D in the UK. At 21°C, a 1-log10 
inactivation of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 sprayed onto 
fomite surfaces (plastic, metal and wood) requires 3.0 - 3.5 minutes when treated 
immediately with 1% (w/v) Virkon S disinfectant (C. Warren, personal communication) 
confirming that this disinfectant rapidly inactivates HPAIV. However, there is no 
information on whether the inactivation is log-linear and over how many logs. Furthermore 
in the poultry house environment, the virus will be physically sequestered in an organic 
matrix (feed, debris, faeces, poultry litter and other secretions) which would not only buffer 
the pH but also protect the virus through inactivating the residual disinfectant (Lucyckx et 
al., 2015). Thus dried faecal pats, accumulated dust, layering of faecal material and 
matted feathers on the muck belts are the areas to be considered not only in terms of 
HPAIV loading, but also in terms of the matrix for decay and inactivation (R. Davies, 
personal communication). To address this, total aerobic bacteria count data presented by 
Lucyckx et al. (2015) for C&D of an operational poultry house are used as the data source 
for the degree of inactivation by C&D. 1% Virkon S is effective against bacteria and viruses 
(Hernndez et al. 2000) and the total aerobic bacteria counts recorded by Lucyckx et al. 
(2015) before and after C&D are used to calculate the fraction of pathogen surviving 
C&D in those parts of the poultry house that can be reached by C&D () (i.e. in the 
properly cleansed and disinfectant-treated bulk phase portion). These values are 
presented in Table 1 and represent the values of  used in Equation 2 for the different 
streams. 
Estimating the fraction of debris that by-passes the bulk phase 
The fractions of debris and organic material (and hence associated viruses) in those 
parts within each stream where C&D cannot reach with and without dismantling and 
which therefore by-pass the bulk phase and effective C&D (fbypass) are set out in Table 
2 and define the fbypass parameter for each stream in Equation 2. There are no 
experimental data for the amount of material which does not receive effective C&D. These 
values are therefore determined from estimations made by visiting a chicken layer farm. 
The approach used was to estimate lower and upper values for a uniform distribution. For 
example, it was estimated that between 10% and 40% of virus in material on the manure 
belt could survive preliminary disinfection.  
In effect, fbypass reflects the efficiency of C&D at operational scale, the smaller fbypass, the 
greater the efficiency as less of the virus-contaminated material avoids C&D. The 
preliminary C&D is considered not to be as efficient as secondary C&D. After preliminary 
C&D, a considerable amount of organic matter is still present and it is assumed for 
example that 25% remains on the manure belt (Table 2). During preliminary C&D, dead 
birds and the litter are cleared out, however there is no degreasing or scrubbing. There is 
only drenching with disinfectant. Thus preliminary C&D is assumed to be of relatively low 
efficiency (Table 2) depending on the stream. For example, it is assumed that the manure 
belt is least effectively cleansed, with 10 to 40% of material not being cleansed/disinfected 
properly. In contrast, it is assumed that only 1 to 10% of the floor is not cleansed in 
preliminary C&D. While the physical disturbance of preliminary C&D may produce aerosols 
these are negligible compared to the proportions of material assumed to be remaining 
overall. 
In contrast to preliminary C&D, secondary C&D is much more thorough with power washes 
and fine brushes through greater workforce deployment to maximise removal of organic 
material. Degreasing and disinfection are undertaken and then repeated after 7 days. This 
is reflected in the smaller fractions of material that by-pass the process in secondary C&D 
(Table 2) compared to preliminary C&D. Dismantling further reduces fbypass compared to 
not dismantling for the equipment streams. Again the fractions for by-pass are based on 
expert opinion of what is achievable in practice rather than experimental data. Two 
secondary C&D scenarios are considered, namely without and with dismantling. Higher 
percentage by-pass is assumed without dismantling (Table 2). 
Exposure through inhalation of dust and ingestion by the restocked poultry 
As for the by-pass fractions, the fractions of the infective material remaining after C&D 
that are inhaled (finhale) and ingested (fingest) by the restocked poultry as out in Table 1 
for each of the streams are based on expert opinion and assumptions in the absence of 
data. Although there is considerable uncertainty in these estimates, it is considered they 
are worst case assumptions. It is assumed that moving parts convert 10% of any 
remaining infectivity into dust which is inhaled by the restocked of birds. Similarly 10% of 
any material remaining on the floor is suspended into the air through the disturbance by 
people walking through the poultry house. It is assumed that only 0.01% of any material 
left in the metal troughs is actually inhaled by the birds. It is assumed that 50% of any 
material left in the metal troughs, moving hoppers and chains is ingested by the birds, 
while the birds have no access to any material on the floors and only limited access to the 
waste streams. 
Calculation of exposures to restocked poultry 
The infectivity ingested by the restocked poultry through each stream 
(EID50_ingest_stream) was calculated as 
𝐸𝐼𝐷50_𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 = 𝐸𝐼𝐷50_𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 × 10
−
𝑇𝑏𝐷𝑅
𝐷𝑡 × 𝑓𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 × 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡 
where EID50_source_stream is the source term infectivity in a given stream immediately 
after depopulation of the infected poultry as calculated by Equation 1 and fsurvive_stream 
is the fraction of input pathogen surviving C&D for each stream as calculated by 
Equation 2. Similarly the infectivity inhaled by the restocked poultry through each 
stream (EID50_inhale_stream) was calculated as 
𝐸𝐼𝐷50_𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 = 𝐸𝐼𝐷50_𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 × 10
−
𝑇𝑏𝐷𝑅
𝐷𝑡 × 𝑓𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 × 𝑓𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒 
It should be noted that infective material present in the manure source term in Equation 1 
may be converted to dust during the operation of equipment in the restocked poultry house 
and hence inhaled and thus it is appropriate to calculate EID50_inhale_stream from 
EID50_source_stream from Equation 1. 
The total poultry exposure (Exposure_EID50) was calculated for each of the three C&D 
scenarios as.  





Receptor term: Using dose-response to estimate risk of infection for highly 
pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 
While the EID50 is a useful assay to measure levels of live virus in manure components 
and airborne particulate, a dose-response is required to convert EID50 units into live 
chicken ID50 units, where one chicken ID50 is the amount of infectious virus which when 
given to a single chicken has a 50% probability of infecting that chicken. According to 
Aldous et al. (2010) there are 103.4 EID50 units per chicken ID50 for H5N1 HPAIV 
(A/turkey/Turkey/1/05) in live chickens on challenge through both the intraocular (0.1 ml) 
and intranasal (0.1 ml) routes. Since H7N1 HPAIV is less infectious to chickens than H5N1 
HPAIV with an ID50 of 104.6 EID50 (Aldous et al., 2010), the H5N1 data are used here. Thus 
it is assumed that there are 103.4 EID50/chicken ID50 and the number of chicken ID50s 
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#  run: "R-studio desktop" 
#  written: "R version 3.4.1" 
#--- 
### Model ---- 
Risk_Calc <- function(Mass, EID50, Number_Birds, p_Remain, days_of_shedding, 
                      Scenario, Parameters1, Parameters2, 
                      ns, min, max, min_TbDR, max_TbDR, 
                      Parameters4, Parameters5,  
                      EID50_oralID50, CV)  
             { 
              Source_term_calculation <-function(Mass, EID50, Number_Birds, p_Remain, 
days_of_shedding) 
                    { 
                    Cloacal=Mass*EID50[1]*Number_Birds*0.5*p_Remain 
                    GAL=EID50[2]*Number_Birds*0.5*days_of_shedding 
                    I=cbind(Cloacal,GAL) 
                    rownames(I)="Infectivity" 
                    return(Source_term_calculation=I) 
                    }  
# Estimating the uniform distributions for the fraction by-passing the bulk phase 
              simul<-function(ns, min, max, min_TbDR, max_TbDR)  
                     { 
                      l1=as.numeric(dim(min)[1]) 
                      l2=as.numeric(dim(min)[2]) 
                      y<-array(dim=c(l1,l2,ns)) 
                      y1<-c() 
                      y2<-array(dim=c(l1+1,l2,ns)) 
                      for (j in 1:ns){ 
                        for (i in 1:l1){ 
                          for (k in 1:l2){ 
                            y[i,k,j]<-runif(1, min[i,k], max[i,k])   
                          }#k 
                        }#i 
                        y1<-runif(1, min_TbDR, max_TbDR) 
                        y2[,,j]<-array(rbind(y[,,j],y1)) 
                        }#j 
                      return(Parameters3=y2) 
                       }#fun 
   Source_term<-Source_term_calculation (Mass, EID50, Number_Birds,  
                                         p_Remain, days_of_shedding) 
# Initial infection on Equipment 
  DIF=array(dim=c(7,2)) 
  dimnames(DIF)<-list(c("Metal trough","Moving hopper", "Moving chain", 
                        "Manure belt", "Cross conveyer", "Air drying eqp", 
                        "Floor"), 
                      c("Manure","Airborne particulate")) 
  for (i in 1:length(Source_term)) { 
    DIF[,i]=Source_term[i]*(Parameters1[,i]) 
  } 
# Decay Rate as a costant 
 
  Parameters3<-simul(ns, min, max, min_TbDR, max_TbDR) 
  nc=as.numeric(dim(Parameters3)[2]) 
  nit=as.numeric(dim(Parameters3)[3]) 
  nr=as.numeric(dim(Parameters3)[1])-1 
  eff_decay<-array(dim=c(7,2)) 
   
  if (Scenario==1) { 
    DIF4=array(dim=c(1,nit)) 
    mod="Preliminary disinfection" 
  }      else if (Scenario==2) 
  { 
    DIF4=array(dim=c(nit,nit)) 
    mod="Secondary: By-pass rate without dismantling" 
  }  else if (Scenario==3)  
  { 
    DIF4=array(dim=c(nit,nit)) 
    mod="Secondary: By-pass rate with dismantling" 
  } 
  for(ii in 1:nit){ 
    # print (ii) 
    eff_decay<-DIF/10^((Parameters3[nr+1,1,ii])/10) 
# Effect of C&D 
# Viral loadings after cleansing and disinfection 
    By_pass_preliminary=array(dim=c(7,2)) 
    By_pass_secondary_without_dismantling=array(dim=c(7,2)) 
    By_pass_secondary_with_dismantling=array(dim=c(7,2)) 
    dimnames(By_pass_preliminary)=list(c("Metal trough","Moving hopper", "Moving chain", 
                                        "Manure belt", "Cross conveyer", "Air drying eqp", 
                                        "Floor"),  
                                       c("Manure","Airborne particulate")) 
    By_pass_preliminary=(1-Parameters3[-(nr+1),1,ii])*Parameters2+Parameters3[-
(nr+1),1,ii] 
    DIF1=eff_decay*By_pass_preliminary 
# Different scenarios 
    if (Scenario==1) { 
      DIF2=DIF1 
      DIF3=array(dim=c(7,2)) 
      dimnames(DIF3)=list(c("Metal trough","Moving hopper", "Moving chain", 
                                 "Manure belt", "Cross conveyer", "Air drying eqp", 
                                 "Floor"),  
                               c("Manure","Airborne particulate")) 
      for (j in 1:2) { 
        DIF3[,j]=DIF2[,j]*(Parameters4[,j]+Parameters5[,j]) 
                     } 
      DIF4[1,ii]=sum(DIF3, na.rm=TRUE) 
               }  else if (Scenario==2) 
          { 
      for (jj in 1:nit) { 
        By_pass_secondary_without_dismantling=(1-Parameters3[-(nr+1),2,jj])* 
                                              Parameters2+Parameters3[-(nr+1),2,jj] 
        DIF2=DIF1*By_pass_secondary_without_dismantling 
        DIF3=array(dim=c(7,2,nit)) 
        dimnames(DIF3)=list(c("Metal trough","Moving hopper", "Moving chain", 
                              "Manure belt", "Cross conveyer", "Air drying eqp", 
                              "Floor"),  
                            c("Manure","Airborne particulate")) 
        for (j in 1:2) { 
          DIF3[,j,jj]=DIF2[,j]*(Parameters4[,j]+Parameters5[,j]) 
                       } 
        DIF4[jj,ii]=sum(DIF3, na.rm=TRUE) 
                          } 
           }  else if (Scenario==3)  
               { 
          for (jjj in 1:nit) { 
            By_pass_secondary_with_dismantling=(1-Parameters3[-(nr+1),3,jjj])* 
                                               Parameters2+Parameters3[-(nr+1),3,jjj] 
            DIF2=DIF1*By_pass_secondary_with_dismantling 
            DIF3=array(dim=c(7,2,nit)) 
            dimnames(DIF3)=list(c("Metal trough","Moving hopper", "Moving chain", 
                                  "Manure belt", "Cross conveyer", "Air drying eqp", 
                                  "Floor"),  
                                c("Manure","Airborne particulate")) 
            for (j in 1:2) { 
              DIF3[,j,jjj]=DIF2[,j]*(Parameters4[,j]+Parameters5[,j]) 
                           } 
            DIF4[jjj,ii]=sum(DIF3, na.rm=TRUE) 
                               } 
                } 
      } 
# Predicted Risk 
  PI=(DIF4/EID50_oralID50)*CV 
  return(list(Scenario=mod,  
              Infect=Source_term, 
              PredictedRisk=PI, 
              Infectivity=DIF4, 
              Exposure_median=median(DIF4), 
              Exposure_CI_low=quantile(DIF4, 0.025), 
              Exposure_CI_high=quantile(DIF4, 0.975), 
              Probability_CI_low=quantile(PI, 0.025), 
              Probability_CI_high=quantile(PI, 0.975), 
              Probability_median=median(PI) 
  )) 
} 
### Defining parameters ---- 
# Mass 
Mass <- 120 
# EID_50 
EID50<-c(Cloacal=5011.8723362727,  
         GeneralAirborneLoading=1.7864041909) 
# Number of birds 
Number_Birds <- 129000 
# Minimum and maximum values used to define the uniform distributiions by-passing  









# Defining the time minimum and maximum values of the  
# period between depopulation of infected poultry and  
# restocking with the new birds 
min_TbDR<-40 
max_TbDR<-90 
# Defining Number of simulation ---- 
ns <- 1000 
# p_remain 
p_remain <- 0.001 
# Defining number of days of shedding 
days_of_shedding <- 1.3 
# Defining scenario: 
# Preliminary disinfection = 1 
# Secondary: By-pass rate without dismantling = 2 
# Secondary: By-pass rate with dismantling = 3 
scenario <- c(1:3)  
### Defining Parameters1 = Fractions of infectivity entering the different streams ----  
X=c(0.001, 0.001, 0.001, 0.897,  0.05, 0.05, NA, 
    0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.2, 0.1, 0.05, 0.62) 
Parameters1<-array(X, dim=c(7,2)) 
dimnames(Parameters1)<-list(c("Metal trough","Moving hopper", "Moving chain", 
                              "Manure belt", "Cross conveyer", "Air drying eqp", 
                              "Floor"),  
                            c("Manure","Airborne particulate")) 
### Defining Parameters2 = Fractions of infectivity surviving C&D through the different 
streams ----  
Y=c(0.0003162278, 7.94328234724282E-05, 7.94328234724282E-05,
 2.51188643150958E-05, 7.94328234724282E-05, 6.30957344480193E-05, 
7.94328234724282E-05,  
    0.0003162278, 7.94328234724282E-05, 7.94328234724282E-05,
 2.51188643150958E-05, 7.94328234724282E-05, 6.30957344480193E-05,
 7.94328234724282E-05) 
Parameters2<-array(Y, dim=c(7,2)) 
dimnames(Parameters2)<-list(c("Metal trough","Moving hopper", "Moving chain", 
                              "Manure belt", "Cross conveyer", "Air drying eqp", 
                              "Floor"),  
                            c("Manure","Airborne particulate")) 
### Defining Parameters4 = Fractions of infectivity inhaled through the different streams --
--  
K=c(0.0001, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1,  
    0.0001, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1) 
Parameters4<-array(K, dim=c(7,2)) 
dimnames(Parameters4)<-list(c("Metal trough","Moving hopper", "Moving chain", 
                              "Manure belt", "Cross conveyer", "Air drying eqp", 
                              "Floor"),  
                            c("Manure","Airborne particulate")) 
### Defining Parameters5 = Fractions of infectivity ingested through the different streams -
---  
M<- c(0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.01, 0.01, 0.1, 0,  
      0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.01, 0.01, 0.1, 0) 
Parameters5=array(M, dim=c(7,2)) 
dimnames(Parameters5)<-list(c("Metal trough","Moving hopper", "Moving chain", 
                              "Manure belt", "Cross conveyer", "Air drying eqp", 
                              "Floor"),  
                            c("Manure","Airborne particulate")) 
### Running the model ----  
for (s in 1:(length(scenario))) { 
results[[s]] <-Risk_Calc(Mass, EID50, Number_Birds, p_remain,  
                         days_of_shedding, s, Parameters1, Parameters2,  
                         ns,min,max,min_TbDR, max_TbDR, Parameters4, Parameters5,  
                         10^3.4, 0.69) 
 
 
